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Abstract: 
This study analyzes the impact of Mafia on the allocation of EU funding. We focus on EU subsidies 
directed to the 390 Sicilian municipalities from 2007 to 2019. We proxy current Mafia activity by 
confiscated real estate assets from organized crime and instrument it with geographical shifters of 
land value. We show that the presence of Mafia increments the amount of EU funds and the number 
of EU projects assigned to municipalities. We repeat the analysis across different types of 














Acknowledgements: We thank Guglielmo Barone and Guido De Blasio for their helpful 
suggestions and assistance in sharing part of the data. 
 This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), 
POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) 
and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209).  
 2 
1. Introduction 
According to recent estimates, the total combined annual revenues of Mafias in Italy are equal 
to 10.7 billion euros (Transcrime 2013).1  The main source of earnings for organized crime groups 
are illegal activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, and extorsion. Since the 1970, organized 
crime also started to re-invest its profits within the legal-economy, by infiltrating politics and 
administration at the local level (Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco 2020).   
In this context, an important source of revenues for criminal organizations is the 
misappropriation of public funds. For instance, Barone and Narciso (2015) show that 
municipalities with stronger Mafia presence are between 62 and 64 percentage points more likely 
to receive public subsidies and they obtain on average a higher amount of funds. 
At the same time, among public funding, emerging evidence suggests that also a great fraction 
of EU funds is lost in fraud and corruption; according to the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), 
254 recommendations were issued in 2019 mostly concerning the recovery of nearly 485 million 
EU funds. Only in January 2020, Italian authorities have arrested 94 members linked to two Mafia 
clans in Sicily that were targeting EU rural development funds worth 5.5 million euros (EU-OCS). 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of organized crime on EU disbursements in Sicily, which is 
of great interest for two reasons. First, Southern-Italian regions receive on average a higher fraction 
of EU Structural funds, mainly EU regional development funds, as their GDP per capita is below 
75% of the EU27 average. In particular, Sicily received more than 36 billion euros from Cohesion 
policy programs since 2007, while Italy in total received more than 170 billion euros, including 
 
1 Mafias comprises: Camorra from Campania, ‘Ndrangheta from Calabria, criminal organization from Apulia and 
Sicilian Mafia. 
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both EU and national resources (Opencoesione). Second, Mafia presence is traditionally stronger 
in Southern regions (Transcrime, 2013), and in particular, looking at the historical origins of Mafia, 
it initially developed in Sicily.  
Given the high concentration of EU funding and organized crime presence in this region, our 
analysis aims at improving the understanding of organized crime activity by detecting the (causal) 
effect of Mafia on the distribution of EU transfers. We aggregate the amount of EU funds and 
projects received by each of the 390 Sicilian municipalities during the 2007 – 2019 period, that 
covers two complete EU funding programs each operating in seven years cycles. We look at 
subsidies from EU Structural funds, that usually require a national co-funding amount and focus 
on the fraction financed exclusively by EU resources.  
To define a causal relationship between organized crime and EU funding, we must deal with 
endogeneity concerns due to measurement errors, omitted variable bias, and reverse causality. We 
mitigate these concerns as follows. First, we proxy for Mafia presence, at the municipal level, 
aggregating data on the confiscations of real estate properties from organized crime during the 
same period. Second, we use the identification strategy proposed by Barone and Narciso (2015) 
and instrument Mafia by exogenous shifters of land value, namely rainfall shocks in the 19th 
century, altitude and slope, conditional on province dummies and a vector of socio-economic 
controls. 
We find that Mafia has a positive impact on the number of EU projects assigned to a 
municipality and on the amount of EU funds. Additionally, we show that Neighboring-Mafia 
doesn’t seem to impact the allocation of transfers assigned to a single municipality. Furthermore, 
we look at the impact of organized crime on EU funding subdivided in different types of 
investments.  
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Our results are consistent through the analysis and hold when excluding province capitals of 
the region, and the municipalities that experienced the dismissal of their city council due to mafia 
infiltrations, confirming that our results are not driven, respectively, by most populated cities or 
extreme cases of corruption.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the most relevant related 
literature; Section 3 describes our data sources and some descriptive statistics; Sections 4 presents 
our empirical framework; Section 5 presents our results and robustness checks; Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Our study is related to the literature examining the consequences of organized crime presence 
on different outcomes. One large strand of the literature explores the effectiveness and the 
economic impact of policies combating corruption; studying the effect of Mafia removal can be 
seen as indirectly looking at the consequences of organized crime activity. 
For instance, many authors analyze one of the most aggressive anti-corruption policies in Italy, 
namely the “city council dismissal”, that consists in the removal of all public officials of a city 
council when a municipality is found to be infiltrated by Mafia.  
 Acconcia, Corsetti and Simonelli (2014) find that these episodes often resulted in contractions 
of public spending, thus they adopt these events as instruments to study the effect of spending cuts 
on output at the provincial level. Daniele and Geys (2015) measure the effect of city council 
dismissals on the education of elected politicians, their analysis comprises all the municipalities in 
Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia. Using a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) strategy, they find 
the causal impact of law enforcement against organized crime on politicians’ human capital to be 
positive. Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco (2020) look at the impact of Mafia on the assignment of 
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public resources. Their DiD estimates provide evidence that infiltrated municipalities do not alter 
the overall amount of financial resources, in contrast they concentrate on specific components of 
public spending: they spend more resources in construction and waste management and less on 
municipal police forces. 
While the mentioned works examine the effect of Mafia removal, another strand of literature 
directly approaches the economic consequences of organized crime. Pinotti (2015) applies 
synthetic control methods to estimate the counterfactual economic performance of Puglia and 
Basilicata in the absence of organized crime. Looking at a 30 years period, he finds that the rise of 
organized crime is correlated with an aggregate economic loss of 16% of GDP per capita. 
Scognamiglio (2015) documents the effect of a legislative provision allowing the relocation of 
mafia members to another town in Italy. Using a DiD estimation, she finds that mafia relocation 
to the northern Italian regions had a positive significant effect on employment in the construction 
sector.  
A series of more recent papers focused on the impact of organized crime on firms at the 
municipal level, rather than on broad economic sectors. Le Moglie and Sorrenti (2020) use the 
shock induced to the Italian credit market by the 2007 crisis, to show how provinces with higher 
organized crime presence had a less severe decline in number of new constituted firms after the 
crisis. Their results are consistent with the hypothesis that legal economies more infiltrated by 
organized crime, experienced a lower impact of the crisis. In addition,  Mirenda, Mocetti and 
Rizzica (2019) document the effect of ‘Ndrangheta infiltrations on enterprises located in northern 
and central Italian regions, finding that these infiltrations affect more financially unstable firms 
and firms reliant on public sector demand. They also show how the revenues of the infiltrated firms 
increase while the local economic growth in the long-run is negatively affected. Slutzky and 
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Zeume (2019) contribute to the debate providing evidence that Mafia also acts as a barrier to entry 
in the market and thus lowers competition, while creating business for firms under its protection. 
Within the strand of literature that analyzes the economic impact of organized crime, there are 
studies that investigate the economic effects of organized crime on public transfers, and they are 
most closely related to the present paper.  
For instance, Barone and Narciso (2015) prove that Mafia has a positive impact on the 
allocation of public funds. They overcome the endogeneity concerns related to organized crime 
activity, instrumenting Mafia in Sicilian municipalities with Rainfall in the 19th century and 
geographical shifters of land productivity. As already mentioned, they conclude that municipalities 
with greater current Mafia activity are more likely to receive public subsidies and they obtain on 
average a higher amount of funds. This work is very close to our empirical investigation, not only 
because we use a very similar identification strategy, but also because the funds considered by 
them, those granted by Law 488/92, were partly financed by EU resources. Differently from the 
above mentioned studies,  Barone and Narciso (2015) are not looking at the counterfactual analysis 
of a policy intervention, but focus on the role of Mafia as key factor in the spatial allocation of 
public transfers, similarly we analyze the effect of Mafia on the spatial allocation of EU resources.  
The present study differs in several ways from the last mentioned paper. While using a similar 
identification strategy for Sicilian municipalities, we examine the effect of Mafia activity primarily 
on the assignment of EU disbursements. We also analyze a longer and different period, namely 
from 2007 to 2019. Additionally, we use a different measure of Mafia at the municipal level, for 
instance the number of seized properties from organized crime instead of mafia-related crimes. 
Daniele and Di Poppa (2019) also show the impact of organized crime on public funds 
allocation, by proving the existence of mafia-infiltrated firms applying for European funding. 
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Using an Italian law that requires companies applying for more than 150.000 euros to undergo a 
screening to determine whether they are connected to Mafia, they observe companies mainly from 
mafia-affected cities and operating in mafia-affected sectors sorting below the cut-off value, in 
order to avoid the investigation.  
Finally, since we look at the effect of organized crime specifically on the allocation of EU 
funds, our study is related to the existing empirical contributions looking at the effect of European 
regional policies on the economic performance of treated regions (Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 
2010; Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 2012; Santos and Tavares 2016; Barone, David and de Blasio 
2016; Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 2017). Many studies focus on objective 1 regions (e.g. Italian 
Southern regions) that absorb the largest part of resources as their GDP per capita is below 75% 
of the European average (Giua 2016; Di Cataldo 2017).  
3. Data 
3.1 EU funding variables 
The measures of European funds are based on data made publicly available by OpenCoesione, 
an open government initiative managed by the Department of Cohesion Policy at the Presidency 
of the Council of Ministers. The portal provides access to all Cohesion Policy projects financed 
both by EU and national resources.2 Cohesion policy aims at reducing the regional disparities in 
the level of development between regions by strengthening economic and social cohesion, and 
Southern Italian regions (on average poorer than the rest of Italy) are an area that has been 
receiving large amounts of EU financing. We focus specifically on the portion of financing 
 
2 Cohesion policy is financed under the European Structural Funds (EU resources), the National Development and 
Cohesion Fund and the Cohesion Action Plan (both national resources). 
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originating from EU resources, namely EU Structural and Investment funds for the cycles 2007-
2013 and 2014-2020, that comprise the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. According to OpenCoesione, Italy attracted around 57 billion 
euros for the first cycle and 46 billion for the second, without including additional national 
resources. The available information includes: nature of  investment (infrastructure, goods and 
services procurement, incentives to firms or individuals and capital contributions), the theme 
(which sector receives funding), the localization (which municipality receives funding), the 
beneficiaries (public or private entities residing in the municipalities), the EU funding and the 
national co-financing amount. 
We restrict our analysis to the Cohesion projects from 2007 to 2019 awarded to beneficiaries 
living in Sicilian municipalities, namely around 9.7 billion euros. Furthermore, as one project may 
involve multiple municipalities, making it difficult to uncover the share of payment received by 
each single municipality, we focus on projects involving exclusively one municipality. We 
aggregate the data for the whole period. In the upper panel of table 1 we can see the different 
summary statistics for each measure of EU transfers, namely around 5 billion euros divided across 
Figure 1 Funds and Projects. 
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57000 projects.  In figure 1 we can observe respectively how EU funds and EU projects are 
spatially distributed among the 390 Sicilian municipalities.  
3.2 Mafia measures 
There are many publicly available measures of criminal organization presence at the provincial 
level, e.g. the number of Mafia related crimes (ISTAT) or the Transcrime Mafia Index (Calderoni 
2014), while measuring the presence of organized crime at a more specific level, as at the 
municipal level, is not easy. Many authors used confidential datasets made available by the Italian 
Ministry of Interior, that merged information about: mafia-related crimes, seized assets from 
criminal organizations and dismissed city councils infiltrated by Mafia (Barone and Narciso 2015, 
De Angelis, De Blasio and Rizzica 2017, Daniele and Geys 2015). To our knowledge, the only 
publicly available measures of Mafia at the municipal level are dismissed-municipalities and 
seized assets from criminal organizations.  
We decide to adopt the latter as our proxy for Mafia presence; the confiscation of a property 
can be an accessory penalty when you are found guilty of Mafia related crimes, thus the 
confiscation order is strong evidence for the presence of organized crime on the territory up until 
the confiscation occurs: Mafia is operating in the municipality for some time.  
The data consists of confiscated firms and real estate properties and is provided by the National 
Italian Agency Responsible for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and 
Confiscated from organized crime (ANBSC). We restrict our analysis to confiscated real estate 
properties in Sicilian municipalities from 2007 to 2019. We can observe in figure 2 how our 
measure is spatially distributed on the Italian island. Furthermore, these events are not concentrated 
at the beginning or in the end of the period, but they are distributed homogenously in time 
(Appendix, figure 1A). In table 1, we see that there are on average 13.4 seized properties per 
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municipality over the period. The number of confiscated real estate properties in  Sicily amount to 
more than 5000 from 2007 to 2019, relatively to around 16000 seized real estate properties on the 
whole national territory, since year 2000. This is consistent with the fact that most of the 
confiscations occurred in southern regions where organized crime is traditionally stronger 
(Transcrime, 2013).  
 
3.3 Instrumental variables and controls 
 We extract the data on rainfall in the 19th century from a study by Pauling et al. (2005) that 
reconstructs seasonal precipitation in Europe for the period 1500-1900 on the basis of paleoclimate 
measures.3 The data is available at 0.5° × 0.5° grid resolution, each Sicilian Municipality is 
allocated into a cell by minimizing the distance between the municipality and the center of the cell, 
proceeding as in Barone and Narciso (2015). In total the 390 Sicilian municipalities are assigned 
to 25 different precipitation cells. In particular, we measure the rainfall shocks in the 19th century 
as the proportion of the average annual rainfall in 1851-60 on the long-run average annual rainfall 
 
3 We are grateful to G. Barone for helping with the extraction of the data. 
Figure 2 Mafia. 
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over 1800-50. The data on the other instruments, altitude and slope, are extracted from the Italian 
National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT).  
Finally, we use additional variables referring to local population density, local employment rate 
and local educational attainment(i.e. number of high school and college graduates/on total 
population, excluding children 6 years old or younger). These control variables are extracted from 
the 2011 Italian Census carried out by ISTAT. The summary statistics for controls and instruments 
are reported in the lower panel of table 1.  
 Table 1 Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent variables      
EU Funds (000’s) 390 11642.835 53471.556 3.250 809500 
EU Projects 390 147.731 481.002 2 7643 
Panel B: Explanatory variable      
Mafia 390 13.364 87.271 0 1657 
Panel C: Control variables      
Population Density 390 0.332 0.626 0.003 5.215 
Employment rate 390 0.301 0.035 0.223 0.399 
Human Capital 390 0.328 0.067 0.177 0.609 
Panel D: Instrumental variables      
Rainfall 390 0.982 0.014 0.959 1.026 
Slope 390 0.221 0.14 0.018 0.799 
Altitude 390 0.419 0.27 0.018 1.37 
 
4.  Identification Strategy 
We aim at estimating the effect of Mafia presence on the allocation of EU transfers in Sicilian 
municipalities. First, we try to estimate the effect by OLS, then we carry out an instrumental 
variable analysis to correct for the possible endogeneity of Mafia. Our analysis exploits cross-
sectional/municipality variation.  
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We rely on two measures of EU funds as our dependent variables, respectively the total amount 
of funds in euros 𝐸𝑈𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  and the total number of projects 𝐸𝑈𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 , allocated to a Sicilian 
municipality from 2007 to 2019. Our explanatory variable is a proxy for Mafia activity at the 
municipal level, namely the number of seized real estate properties from organized crime by the 
Italian  government. We consider the natural logarithmic form of both the dependent and the 
explanatory variables.  
Our two main specifications are respectively:  
ln(𝐸𝑈𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑖𝑝 =  𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎)𝑖𝑝 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑝𝛽3 + 𝑢𝑖𝑝                   (1)    
ln(𝐸𝑈𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑝 =  𝛾𝑝 + 𝛾2ln (𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎)𝑖𝑝 +  𝑋′𝑖𝑝𝛾3 + 𝑣𝑖𝑝                (2) 
 
where Χ is a vector that comprises educational attainment, employment and population density to 
account for heterogeneity across municipalities. Furthermore, as the Sicilian island is subdivided 
in nine provinces, we include province fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the 
rainfall-cell level, since as previously mentioned, the Sicilian municipalities are located within 25 
cells to measure precipitation shocks.   
An advantage of focusing on one southern Italian region rather than on the whole South, is that 
the sample is restricted to an homogenous area in terms of unobservable effects such as culture 
and social capital, in a country where this elements are considered very diversified (Di Cataldo 
and Mastrorocco 2020). 
As pointed out by Barone and Narciso (2015), the relation between the dependent variables and 
organized crime could be endogenous for three reasons. First, receiving more EU transfers (or 
being assigned a higher number of EU projects) could have a positive impact on the expansion of 
Mafia: in this case the identification would suffer from reverse causality because the relation 
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between dependent and independent variable wouldn’t be one-directional (e.g. Fazekas and King 
2018, study the effect of EU Funds on high‐level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary 
in 2009–2012.). Second, the measure of organized crime, namely real estate properties confiscated 
by the government could suffer from measurement error: for example in municipalities where 
Mafia activity is stronger, part of the evidence that could have resulted in a confiscation order 
could have been covered up or not reported. 4 Endogeneity could also origin from omitted variable 
bias, this is the case if determinants of EU transfer allocation are unobserved and correlated to 
Mafia activity, thus causing Mafia to be correlated with the error term of the regression.  
On these grounds, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach and resort to the instruments 
used by Barone and Narciso (2015).  To find instruments that respect the exogeneity and relevance 
restrictions they go back to the origins of Sicilian Mafia. In their study, they point out that Mafia 
is known to be born in the second half of the 19th century, in the passage from the Borbone dynasty 
to unified Italy (1861). In particular, Mafia emerged as an industry for private protection (Gambetta 
1993). At the same time, in that historic context there was a great demand for private protection 
mainly for three reasons. The first was that the end of Feudalism had opened up the market of land, 
and as there wasn’t still legislation protecting the property of newly acquired lands, private 
protection was needed. Second, the Italian state was still not born (until 1861) and the vacuum of 
power allowed Mafia to emerge without meeting any opposition. Furthermore, the South of Italy 
inherited a persistent distrust in public protection from  the Spanish domination. 
Given this historical framework, Barone and Narciso (2015) conclude that value of land seems 
one of the most important causes of demand for protection. In other words, the more the land was 
 
4 Due to “Omertà”, the fear of Mafia’s revenge. Barone and Narciso (2015) mention Pinotti (2014).  
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productive in agricultural terms, the more is was valuable and needed protection. Thus, variables 
affecting the productivity of land would respect the relevance condition and be correlated with 
Mafia activity. For these reasons, they propose as instruments for current Mafia activity 
geographical shifters of land productivity, such as: rainfall shocks in the ten years preceding the 
Italian unification, altitude and slope.  
Regarding the exogeneity of the instruments, they claim that these geographical shifters are 
unlikely to be correlated to current economic conditions because modern agriculture is much less 
dependent on these factors, and nowadays it plays a smaller role in the economy. Furthermore, the 
exclusion restriction would not hold if the instrumental variables, conditional on our controls, 
affected European funding through other channels than organized crime activity, that we are not 
controlling for.  
We proceed in our analysis using the same set of instruments for our measure of Mafia presence, 
thus our model will exploit cross-sectional variation as the instruments we use are time invariant.  
After having selected valid instruments, we can recur to 2SLS estimation to overcome the 
above-mentioned endogeneity concerns. In particular, we will be able to estimate the impact of 
Mafia on the assignment of EU funds and projects in two stages. In the first stage (3) we isolate 
the exogenous variation of Mafia regressing the endogenous variable on the IVs, while in the 
second stage (4. and 5.) we exploit the obtained exogenous variation to estimate the effect of 
organized crime on the dependent variables (EU funds and projects).  
 
 ln(𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎)𝑖𝑝 = 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑝 + 𝛿3𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑝 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑝𝛿5 + 𝑠𝑖𝑝    (3)   
 ln(𝐸𝑈𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑖𝑝 =  𝛽𝑝 + 𝛽2ln (𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎)𝑖𝑝̂ + 𝑋′𝑖𝑝𝛽3 + 𝑢𝑖𝑝                                               (4)  
 ln(𝐸𝑈𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑝 =  𝛾𝑝 + 𝛾2ln (𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎)𝑖𝑝̂ + 𝑋′𝑖𝑝𝛾3 + 𝑣𝑖𝑝                                            (5)   
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 Possible concerns with our identification strategy could be that outliers might be driving our 
results. To control for this issue, we include in the our main tables below the specifications 
excluding the most populated municipalities (Province capitals), and the cities that experienced an 
aggressive anti-corruption policy (city council dismissal because of mafia infiltrations), in order 
to isolate the effect of Mafia on EU funds allocation. 
5. Results 
5.1 OLS Estimation 
In table 2 we present the OLS estimates, respectively equations (1) and (2) mentioned above, 
for the impact of organized crime on the allocation of EU Projects (columns 1 to 4) and on the 
allocation of EU funds (columns 5 to 8), assigned to beneficiaries resident in a Sicilian 
municipality during the period.  
Columns 1-2 show a positive and significant impact of organized crime on the issuance of 
Cohesion Projects financed by European resources, in particular the specification in column 2 
including both controls and province fixed effects, shows that a 1% increase in Mafia, increases 
on average the number of  EU Projects allocated to a municipality by 0.407%, holding other factors 
fixed. The results are consistent when excluding the nine province capitals of Sicily (column 3), 
showing that the effect of Mafia is not driven by the most populated cities (according to ISTAT 
the population of the province-capitals is equal to more than ¼ of the total Sicilian population). 
Our results are also consistent when excluding the towns that experienced the dismissal of the 
city council due to organized crime infiltrations, suggesting that presence of Mafia is spread on 
the territory and its impact on EU resources is not driven by the most extreme cases of connections 
to organized crime.    
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Table 2 OLS – Mafia and European funding. 
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Controls no yes  yes yes  no yes  yes yes 
Province 
dummies 
yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Obs. 390 390  381 356  390 390  381 356 
R2 0.354 0.419  0.349 0.430  0.254 0.306  0.238 0.311 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variable are measured in logarithms for all specifications. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human capital. 
The total sample comprises all the 390 Sicilian municipalities.  The subsample in columns (3) and (7)excludes the capital-municipalities for each of the nine provinces, while the 
subsample in columns(4) and (8) excludes all the municipalities that experienced city council dismissal due to Mafia infiltrations. Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. 
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
 
The effect of criminal organizations in diverting EU resources is positive and significant also 
when looking at the impact on the total amount of EU funds received by a city during the period 
(columns 5-8). For instance, a 1% increase in Mafia, increases on average the amount of  EU Funds 
allocated to a municipality by 0.365% (column 6), holding other factors fixed. The results are again 
consistent when excluding Province capitals (column 7) and when excluding the municipalities 
that had their city council removed because of connections to organized crime (column 8). 
 5.2 Instrumental variable analysis 
As mentioned in the Identification Strategy  the OLS results could be invalid on the grounds of 
measurement error, omitted variable bias or reverse causality, since the zero conditional mean 
assumption 𝐸(𝑢|𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎) = 0 would not be holding. To overcome this issue we proceed with 
instrumental variable analysis by 2SLS estimation.  
In table 3 we present the estimates of the First stage, that refers to equation (3). According to 
Barone and Narciso (2015), we would expect Rainfall shocks in 1851-60  to have a positive effect 
on value of land (thus on Mafia), while Altitude and Slope are expected to have a negative impact. 
Indeed, we can observe that Rainfall has a positive and statistically significant effect on Mafia 
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(column 2), while Altitude has a negative statistically significant impact (columns 1-2). Slope is 
not significant across the different specifications, but it is included to be coherent with Barone and 
Narciso’s (2015) identification strategy. The excluded instruments are jointly statistically 
significant, in fact the F-test of the exclusion restriction is always greater than 10. These results 
are consistent in our additional specifications excluding province capital cities and mafia infiltrated 
city councils (columns 4-5).   






















-1.005       
(0.799) 
-1.305       
(0.833) 
-1.125       
(0.704) 
 
-0.793       
(0.802) 
-0.951       
(0.810) 
Rainfall 
19.638            
(14.481) 
20.674*            
(12.163) 
  
20.518*   
(11.584) 





3.512        
(8.073) 
   
Controls no yes yes  yes yes 
Obs. 390 390 390  381 356 
F-stat 21.74 20.21 20.10  17.01 12.30 
The endogenous variable -Mafia- is  measured in logarithms. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human 
capital. The total sample comprises all the 390 Sicilian municipalities. The subsample in column (4) excludes the capital-municipalities 
for each of the nine provinces, while the subsample in columns (5) excludes all the municipalities that experienced city council dismissal 
due to Mafia infiltrations. Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 
1% 
 
In column 3, we offer an informal test for the hypothesis that rainfall shocks in the ten years 
preceding the Italian unification are expected to be a good predictor of Mafia activity, by showing 
that, on the other hand, rainfall shocks in the 18th century are not a good instrument for Mafia 
presence.5 For instance, we estimate the first stage using rainfall shocks in 1751- 60 instead of 
 
5 Namely one-hundred years before the Italian Unification.  
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rainfall shocks in 1851-60, and show that the estimated coefficient of rainfall in 1751-60 is indeed 
not statically significant.  
Having explored the link between the endogenous variable Mafia and the instruments, we now 
address the results of the second stage in table 5; these are the estimates of equations (4) and (5). 
Mafia has a positive effect on the number of projects (columns 1 to 4) and on the amount of funds 
(columns 5 to 8), and more importantly the estimated coefficients indicate an upward revision of 
the OLS estimates. In the specification including the controls (column 2), there is a an upward 
revision of 0.32 percentage points of the impact of organized crime on the number of cohesion 
policy projects assigned to a municipality. Similarly, column 6 shows an upward revision of 0.20 
percentage points on the effect of Mafia on the amount of funds allocated. These results hold in 
both models when we do not include the controls (columns 1,5). Furthermore, the results are 
consistent when excluding the nine most populated municipalities (in columns 3 and 7), and when 
excluding the extreme cases of Mafia infiltrated city councils, suggesting once again that our 
results are neither driven by the most populated cities and neither by the most corrupted 
municipalities included in our data set.  
























0.731***        
(0.211) 
 







0.573**          
(0.235) 
 




Controls no yes  yes yes  no yes  yes yes 
Province 
dummies 
yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Obs. 390 390  381 356  390 390  381 356 
R2 0.274 0.330  0.286 0.344  0.220 0.276  0.211 0.289 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variable are measured in logarithms for all specifications. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human capital. 
The total sample comprises all the 390 Sicilian municipalities. The subsample in columns (3) and (7) excludes the capital-municipalities for each of the nine provinces, while the 
subsample in columns(4) and (8) excludes all the municipalities that experienced city council dismissal due to Mafia infiltrations. Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. 
*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
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As pointed out by Barone and Narciso (2015), the main source of downward bias in the OLS 
estimates could be measurement error (i.e. underreporting of proofs against mafia in municipalities 
where mafia presence is stronger could lead to less real estate confiscations) or the presence of an 
omitted variable that is positively correlated with organized crime activity and negatively 
correlated to the dependent variables. 
5.3 Spatial Correlation 
In the next specification, we want to take into account the possibility that Mafia is spatially 
correlated across municipalities, if that were the case we would expect property confiscations 
spillovers across municipalities and ignoring these would result in omitted variable bias (Barone 
and Narciso 2015).  
We replicate our baseline results adding as a control the natural logarithm of Neighbor-Mafiai, 
that measures the number of seized real estate properties in confining municipalities. Table 6 
shows that Mafia is still positive and statistically significant consistently with our baseline results, 
while the measure of spatial correlation Neighbor-Mafiai, is not statistically significant in both 
specifications (columns 1-2), ruling out the mafia spillovers across municipalities.  
In other words, we are capturing the impact of  local organized crime and not the impact of 
neighboring organized crime on EU disbursement; These results suggest that there is no effect on 
EU resources from Mafia coordinating across municipalities, thus the choice of including in our 
analysis projects allocated exclusively to one municipality seems reasonable. On the other hand, 
it could be that projects allocated to multiple municipalities are indeed impacted by mafia 
coordinating across municipalities. Unfortunately the data provided by OpenCoesione doesn’t 
allow to determine to exact share of funding going to each involved municipality. 
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Nonetheless it would be interesting for further research to look at the impact of Mafia and, in 
particular, of Neighboring-Mafiai on EU subsidies directed to multiple municipalities. In fact, from 
2007 to 2019 almost half of the total amount allocated to Sicily was directed to shared projects 
across cities and provinces; as these projects benefit a large number of cities they usually involve 
a larger amount of money, which could attract the interest of criminal organizations. For example, 
the implementing bodies that receive most funding in Sicily are the Italian railway company (RFI) 
and the Italian road company (ANAS), that work mainly on shared projects (e.g. highways 
connecting different cities). 
Table 6  Neighboring Mafia – Measuring spatial correlation 
 EU Projects  EU Funds 
 2SLS  2SLS 









-0.023          
(0.05) 
 
-0.046       
(0.052) 
Controls yes  yes 
Province 
dummies 
yes  yes 
R2 0.344  0.28 
First stage F 26.22  26.22 
Obs. 385  385 
The dependent variable and both the explanatory variables measured in 
logarithms. Only Mafia is instrumented. The control matrix includes 
population density, employment and human capital. We excluded five 
municipalities that are islands. 
Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. *Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
 
 
5.4 Impact on different types of investment 
 Until now we proved that Mafia has a positive and significant effect on the assignment of EU 
funding in Sicily. However, the impact of organized crime on EU subsidies may differ according 
to the economic sectors they are allocated to. The investments of Mafia in the legal economy 
usually affect sectors that require low technological development, have very little regulation, 
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include small-medium enterprises and have a great availability of public resources (Transcrime 
2013). Furthermore, looking at the Firms seized from organized crime in Sicily during 2007-2019 
(figure 3A Appendix) the most affected sectors seem to be construction and wholesale and retail 
commerce. 
To assess whether organized crime has a different impact on EU subsidies depending on the 
type of investment the project is assigned to, we repeat our analysis dividing the projects by nature 
of investment as provided by OpenCoesione. The projects are classified  in  1) Procurement of 
goods and services, 2) Infrastructure 3) Incentives for Firms 4) Grants to individuals 5) Capital 
contributions. Most projects assigned to Sicilian municipalities are allocated to the first two 
typologies of investments. We leave the last type of investment out as there are not enough 
observations included when looking at Cohesion projects assigned exclusively to one municipality. 
Table 5 presents the OLS and 2SLS estimation results for the impact of Mafia on the allocation 
of EU projects and EU funds by types of investments; we obtain the estimates applying the same 
specification discussed in our baseline results, however we substitute the dependent variable with 
EU projects and funds EU funds for each investment type.  
In order to compare the effect of Mafia across different investments we standardize the 
coefficients, obtaining the effect of Mafia on EU funding in standard deviation units (the non-
standardized estimates can be found in the appendix in table 4A). Consistently with our previous 
results the effect of Mafia on the allocation of EU funds is positive and significant across all types 
of investments, suggesting that organized crime in Sicily is interested in attracting EU resources 
across different sectors. The effect of Mafia seems to be strong on Infrastructure related projects, 
but also on Goods and Services Procurement and Incentives to Firms. These results appear to be 
against the common knowledge that organized crime attracts mainly big infrastructure projects, 
 22 
but it is important to underline that we are excluding from our analysis most of these projects as 
they usually belong to the resources directed to multiple municipalities. To visually compare the 
magnitude of the effect of Mafia across projects we include in the appendix the graph of the 
standardized coefficients (figure 4A). 
Table 5 Nature of Investments - Standardized coefficients 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 





0.343***    
(0.036) 






0.160***    
(0.021) 









0.638***       
(0.186) 




 0.379*     
(0.194) 
0.276**       
(0.107) 




R2 - 2SLS 0.279 0.336 0.355 0.209  0.204 0.328 0.196 0.163 
Obs. 388 353 288 349  388 353 288 349 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variable are measured in logarithms. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human capital. The first stage 
F-stat is above 10 for all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
 
5.5 Additional Robustness Checks 
In this section we present a series of additional robustness checks to provide additional evidence 
for our main findings. We start from our baseline estimates in table 4 (columns 2, 6) and implement 
the econometric specifications with alternative subsets of instruments and then with other 
measures of organized crime.  
Columns 3 and 6 of table 5A (Appendix)  show that our previous results are consistent when 
including only a subset of instruments, namely altitude and slope. Furthermore, we construct a 
specification with an alternative measure of Mafia, namely firms seized from organized crime, the 
results are presented in Columns 1, 2 and 4, 5. Both robustness tests presented provide additional 
evidence in favor of a downward bias of the OLS estimates (table 2, columns 2 and 6). 
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Another main concern of our analysis is that it focuses on one Italian region, making it difficult 
to infer external validity of the results in other Italian or European regions. On the other hand, the 
Italian mafia can be seen as the “prototype” for other criminal organization around the world, such 
as drug cartels in South America and the Yakuza in Japan (Pinotti 2015), thus we could assume 
that the results presented in this study can contribute to understand the effect of organized crime 
presence also in a broader context.  
6. Concluding remarks 
An emerging literature suggests that organized crime and corruption distort the well functioning 
of democratic systems as they have the potential to influence key determinants of economic 
activity (Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco 2020).  
In this paper we focus on one way of affecting the economy, namely through the 
misappropriation of public funding, and in particular EU funding. In September 2020, the 
executive director of Europol warned the EU that Mafia “might have set their eyes” on the 
Recovery Funds, urging all member states to monitor carefully where the funding goes. Thus, in 
this moment in time, it is key to provide evidence on the impact of organized crime on the 
assignment of EU funding.  
According to our estimates, municipalities with a stronger Mafia presence receive a higher 
amount of EU funds and of EU projects.  The results hold, when excluding from the analysis the 
province capitals and the municipalities that had their city council dismissed because of 
connections to organized crime. This suggests that most populated cities, and cities experiencing 
a severe anti-corruption policy are not driving the results.  
Additionally, our results are consistent  when  looking at the impact of organized crime on 
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different types of investment of EU transfers. Furthermore, our results suggest that Mafia in 
neighboring municipalities has no role in the diversion of EU subsidies assigned to one 
municipality. 
In conclusion our paper provides an assessment of Mafia as key factor in the spatial allocation 
of EU transfers, and suggests to take into account its presence in a given territory when designing 
funding policies. The majority of EU funding aims at strengthening economic and social cohesion, 
helping mostly European regions, such as Sicily, with a GDP per capita below the 75% of the EU 
average.  As long as the poorest areas are also those with a higher presence of organized crime, 
EU funding policies should take into consideration the possibility that part of the funding may be 
attracted by criminal organization. A possible policy implication could be to accompany funding 
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Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
EU Funds (000’s) Euros 390 11642.835 53471.556 3.250 809500 
EU Projects # of Projects 390 147.731 481.002 2 7643 
Mafia 
# of Confiscated 
Real Estates 
390 13.364 87.271 0 1657 
Alternative measure 
of Mafia  
# of Confiscated 
Firms  









390 0.301 0.035 0.223 0.399 
Human Capital 
# of high school and 
college graduates / 
total population > 6 
years old in 2011 
390 0.328 0.067 0.177 0.609 
Rainfall 









) 390 0.221 0.14 0.018 0.799 
Altitude (000’s) meters 390 0.419 0.27 0.018 1.37 
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                     Figure 1a Properties seized from Mafia by year 
 
 
                      Figure 2a Real estate properties seized from Mafia by category 
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          Figure 3a Seized Firms by category 
 
 
Table 4a Nature of Investments - Non Standardized 
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0.448***    
(0.047) 






0.51***    
(0.066) 









0.832***       
(0.242) 




 0.434*     
(0.222) 
0.878**       
(0.342) 




R2 - 2SLS 0.279 0.336 0.355 0.209  0.204 0.328 0.196 0.163 
Obs. 388 353 288 349  388 353 288 349 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variable are measured in logarithms. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human capital. The first stage 
F-stat is above 10 for all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
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  Figure 4a Mafia Standardized coefficients across investments types 
 
      Table 5a Robustness checks 
 EU Projects  EU Funds 
 





















2.45***        
(0.605) 
   
0.999***  
(0.084) 
1.85***        
(0.052) 
  
Mafia    
0.692***  
(0.196) 
    
0.659***  
(0.237) 
Controls yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes 
Province 
dummies 
yes yes  yes  yes yes  yes 
Obs. 390 390  390  390 390  390 
R2 0.443 0.090  0.350  0.348 0.252  0.247 
Estimation 
method 
OLS 2SLS  2SLS  OLS 2SLS  2SLS 
The dependent variable and the explanatory variable are measured in logarithms. The control matrix includes population density, employment and human capital.  
Standard errors are clustered at Rainfall cell level. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
  
